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Abstract 
This paper has two objectives. First, by mapping investment-based the legal provisions that may result 
in the direct acquisition of citizenship or residence rights through a pecuniary contribution in all the 28 
European Union (EU) Member States, it clears the grounds for further normative inquiries in this 
issue. Second, it discusses the iterative relationship between European Union (EU) citizenship and 
investment-based citizenship programmes, taking into account the intuitive conflict between the values 
inherent in EU citizenship and the opportunity structures that it creates for countries to commodify 
their membership by exchanging it for investment. The paper starts by a theoretical examination of 
membership in national and supranational polities in order to discern the links between national and 
EU citizenship. This is followed by an empirical classification of the different investor and residence 
programmes in the 28 Member States of the EU, aimed at comparing how different countries regulate 
access to membership on grounds of wealth. The conclusion to the paper discusses of the effects of 
investor citizenship and golden residence programmes in the broader EU context, taking into account 
the unique characteristics of European citizenship. 
Keywords 
Citizenship, investment, EU citizenship 
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Introduction 
In mid-January 2014, the European Parliament (EP) held a debate entitled ‘EU citizenship for sale’, to 
discuss the programmes adopted by a number of Member States of the European Union (EU) offering 
either residence or citizenship on grounds of investment. The debate was sparked by the decision of 
the government of Malta, in October 2013, to allow the wealthy individuals who invest 650,000.00 
euros in the country to become Maltese, and by extension, EU citizens. The outcome of the EP debate 
was a resolution (2013/2995[RSP]), ascertaining that the matters related to citizenship are indeed an 
area of exclusive competence of the Member States, but that in regulating their membership, states 
should uphold the values enshrined in the EU treaties, with particular regard to mutual trust and rights 
attached to EU citizenship. Following the EP debate and talks with the European Commission, Malta 
amended its investor citizenship programme to include a one-year effective residence requirement but 
retained its prerogative to naturalise wealthy individuals.  
The EP debate and Malta’s investor programme inform the two key objectives of this paper, which 
go beyond the normative implications examined in some of the contributions to the European Union 
Democracy Observatory (EUDO) on Citizenship forum (Shachar and Bauböck 2014). First, the 
academic studies so far have only tangentially examined and classified the citizenship and residence 
schemes that exist in all the 28 Member States of the EU. While Džankić (2012) proposed some 
general ideas on how the different types of global investment-based programmes could be analysed, 
Carrera (2014) offered a legal analysis of the Maltese scheme by focusing on the notion of sincere 
cooperation. Hence, this paper clears the grounds for further and more substantive studies on the topic 
of investment-based citizenship and residence programs in the EU. Second, the iterative relationship 
between these schemes as an access points for national membership and supranational EU citizenship, 
has also been given scarce attention in the scholarly literature. Thus the second objective of this study 
is to look at the paradox created by the notion of EU citizenship, which is simultaneously an 
embodiment of the EU’s values and an opportunity structure that the countries use to commodify their 
national, and by extension EU citizenship. 
Citizenship of the EU (EU citizenship) has been established by the Maastricht Treaty as a 
mechanism of promoting European values and identity. Its further objective has been to protect the 
rights of citizens of the EU affected by increasing integration dynamics. The array of rights attached to 
EU citizenship has amplified with the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Lisbon Treaty to include the rights 
of free movement, diplomatic protection, linguistic rights, and rights of direct representation in the 
municipal and European parliament elections. However, the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty 
in 1992 resulted in two provisions ascertaining that the supranational EU citizenship is only 
complementary to national citizenship. The guarantees that EU citizenship is not a federal one have 
thus been articulated in articles 9 and 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
confirming that the EU citizenship ‘shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship’. In other 
words, individuals possessing the citizenship of any of the Member States can claim benefits from the 
rights attached to EU citizenship, while the Member States have the sole prerogative to decide on their 
membership.
1
  
This results in a paradoxical iterative relationship between national and EU citizenship, whereby 
one citizenship regime has the potential to distort the other. Rights additional to those of national 
citizenship, activated through mobility in the EU, create an opportunity structure for states to treat 
their citizenship as a commodity and exchange it for investment. We can think of such programs as 
producing ‘stockholder citizens’ (Magni-Berton 2014), because investors have an instrumental interest 
in obtaining the citizenship of an EU Member State. For example, national citizenship of smaller 
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European economies such as Malta and Cyprus do not have much of an allure for the investors. 
Instead, access to the European market and the rights of EU citizenship, particularly mobility, enhance 
the attractiveness of such national memberships in the eyes of investors. This differentiates the 
investment-based citizenship schemes from naturalisation of ordinary migrants, who by virtue of their 
involvement in the community are true ‘stakeholder citizens’ (Bauböck 2007: 2040). 
In order to analyse the different investment-based programmes in the EU and to discern their 
effects on EU citizenship, this paper starts by a section that examines the links between membership in 
national and supranational polities. This is followed by an empirical classification of the different 
investor and residence schemes in the 28 Member States of the European Union, which maps how 
different countries regulate access to membership on grounds of wealth. The conclusion to the paper 
discusses of the effects of investor citizenship and golden residence programmes in the broader EU 
context, taking into account the intricacies of European citizenship.  
2. Citizenship in nested polities: derivation, activation, significance  
To understand the implications of the various residence and citizenship schemes for investors on EU 
citizenship, it is essential to comprehend the relationship between national and EU citizenship. The EU 
citizenship does not and cannot exist on its own, but is linked to national citizenship of Member 
States. In this sense, the EU citizenship is of a derivative nature. Unlike national citizenships, EU 
citizenship is attached to a specific array of rights promulgated in the treaties. Many of these rights are 
de facto activated only when an individual crosses the borders of the Member State whose citizen he 
or she is. These two aspects of the relationship between national and EU citizenship are very much 
entangled, and are of particular relevance for understanding how access to national citizenship through 
investment can corrupt not only the symbolic and democratic values underpinning European 
citizenship, but also the rights and duties stemming from it.  
The relationship between national and EU citizenship is that of a ‘citizenship constellation’, which 
Bauböck (2010: 848) defined as ‘a structure in which individuals are simultaneously linked to several 
political entities, so that their legal rights and duties are determined not only by one political authority, 
but by several’. As argued by Bauböck (2010: 848), ‘citizenship constellations’ apply not only to 
individuals’ migration between states, but also to states formed by subnational polities (e.g., 
federations, confederations) and to supranational polities established by states (e.g. the EU). In this 
sense, EU citizenship is both similar to and different from the citizenship of federal states.  
On the one hand, the EU citizenship has evolved to give certain political rights to individuals 
beyond the territorial boundaries of their Member States. The transfer of these rights also occurs in 
cases of federal and confederal states, whereby membership in the nested polity results in the transfer 
of rights to subnational polities. Access to these polities is linked.  
On the other hand, the nature of this transfer is very much different. In federal and confederal 
states, rights of citizenship are derived both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom up’. This means that the nested 
citizenship gives access to rights at subnational level. By definition, the encompassing polity (i.e. the 
federation) is the access point for citizenship status and rights, which are then distributed to 
subnational polities. Some exceptions from this general definition exist, such as those in Austria and 
Germany, where federal provinces have some discretion in controlling migrants’ access to citizenship; 
or in Switzerland, where cantonal and municipal citizenships give rise to the federal citizenship 
(Bauböck 2007a). Even in these cases, the power of subnational units is derived from the federal level. 
By contrast, access to EU citizenship is exclusively regulated by national naturalisation conditions, 
while the transfer of rights is based on a ‘bottom-up’ dynamic. That is, the access to and the rights of 
EU citizenship are derived by automatism from the national level, but not vice-versa. Individuals 
cannot access EU citizenship directly, and then opt for a citizenship of a Member State. However, if 
they become nationals of any given Member State (and thus receive EU citizenship by default), they 
Investment-based citizenship and residence programmes in the EU 
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may choose to ‘activate’ their EU citizenship by utilizing the rights that such citizenship presupposes 
(Kostakopoulou 2007).  
Table 1. Activation: Rights developed through EU citizenship 
Article Right Active 
in MSc 
Active 
abroad 
Political rights 
Article 22 Voting in European elections: a right to vote and stand in 
elections to the European Parliament, in an EU Member 
State other than their own 
 √ 
Article 22 Voting in municipal elections: a right to vote and stand in 
local elections in an EU state other than their own, under 
the same conditions as the nationals of that state 
 √ 
Article 15 Accessing documents of EU institutions: a right to access 
to European Parliament, Council, and Commission 
documents 
√ √ 
Article 24 Petition to the European Parliament and the 
Ombudsman: the right to petition the European Parliament 
and the right to apply to the European Ombudsman 
√ √ 
Article 24 
Communication rights: the right to write to the EU 
institutions in one of the official languages and to receive a 
reply in that same language 
√ √ 
Rights of free movement 
Article 21 Right to free movement and residence: a right of free 
movement and residence in the entire EU, and the right to 
work in any position (including national civil services, 
unless those involve that safeguard the national interests of 
Member States) 
 √ 
Article 18 Freedom from discrimination on grounds of nationality: 
a right not to be discriminated against on grounds of 
nationality within the scope of application of the Treaty 
 √ 
Rights abroad 
Article 23 Right to consular protection: an entitlement to protection 
by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any other 
Member State when in a third country, if there are no 
diplomatic or consular authorities from the citizen's own 
state  
 √ 
The possibility ‘activation’ is another point of differentiation between EU citizenship and citizenship 
in tightly coupled multilevel polities, such as federal states. In the latter, most tiers of citizenship are 
active for an individual at any given time. In the former, most of the rights of EU citizenship, as 
presented schematically in Table 1 (above), are enforceable through mobility, i.e., once the individual 
crosses the physical boundaries of their own Member State. As a consequence of the possibility to 
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activate the rights of EU citizenship, both within the EU and outside of it (e.g. diplomatic and consular 
protection), the question of access becomes essential. It shows the iterative relationship between EU 
citizenship and investor citizenship, whereby one may have an adverse effect on the other.  
EU citizenship enhances the value of national citizenship by virtue of additional rights enforceable 
beyond the specific Member State’s borders. In such a manner, the EU citizenship amplifies the 
opportunities for Member States to attract investors to naturalise as their national membership offers 
an access point to the benefits of EU citizenship. The fact that the Member States see the EU 
citizenship as an opportunity structure distorts the meaning of national membership, as the latter is 
commodified and exchanged for a pecuniary contribution. In turn, this challenges the values of 
European citizenship, which has not been intended as an instrument for selectively amplifying the 
national membership, but rather as a set of rights reflecting sincere cooperation and mutual trust 
among the Member States. As Johnston noted (2013: 5), ‘the act of exchanging a higher-value good 
(citizenship) for a lower value good (money) destroys the value of citizenship and corrodes public 
trust in that institution in a way that naturalization on other bases does not’. 
Some of the countries that run investor programmes, have a low bar for investors to access the 
rights of EU citizenship and request only a clean criminal record, an oath of allegiance, or pose 
residence requirements that are as low as one year. In others, the exchange of membership for money 
is either not possible, or it is more complex and accompanied by multiple conditions. These 
conditions, which commonly correspond to the ones for ordinary migrants, seek to ensure that an 
individual’s participation in the polity is not based on a simple instrumental interest, but rather a 
fundamental one, an interest that coincides with the well-being and the flourishing of the polity.  
In the former case, we can describe membership as ‘stockholder citizenship’ where ‘individual 
citizens are like a joint-stock company in which fellow-citizens invest’ (Magni-Berton 2014). Put 
simply, ‘stockholder’ citizens see their membership in a polity as instrumental to the materialisation of 
their personal interest. This reduces the scope of citizenship, because the interests of stockholders are 
determined by the share of stocks that they have in the company. Moreover, stocks eventually become 
tradable – not only from the government to an individual, but also among individuals themselves, 
which has a further potential to distort and commodify citizenship.  
In the latter case, membership is closer to ‘stakeholder citizenship’ (Bauböck 2007: 2040). 
‘Stakeholder citizenship’ is different from that of ‘stockholder’ citizenship as it entails the idea of 
conceiving demos in the polity in the increasingly transnational communities through the idea of 
conferring membership to those whose interests are fundamentally affected by communal decisions. 
This implies that we cannot think of investors as stakeholders in the community, because they have 
only an accidental and instrumental interest in citizenship in a state that offers them a favourable 
investment environment.  
For example, if a country applies the ‘stockholder’ citizenship principle, and views investment as 
the major, if not the only criterion for membership, such investment by automatism becomes a 
sufficient contribution for the nested EU citizenship. If it applies the ‘stakeholder’ citizenship, then the 
required contribution will extend to all the conditions required to prove an individual’s commitment to 
the polity (e.g., residence, language tests, etc.).  
If we look at the different types of investment based programmes in the EU Member States, we 
can, in principle, associate the investor citizenship schemes and discretionary naturalization on 
grounds of investment with the ‘stockholder’ citizenship, and the golden residence programmes with 
the potential to develop ‘stakeholder’ citizenship. That is, the former entail an outright exchange 
between money and citizenship, while the latter require the individual to make the new polity the focal 
point of his or her activities. However, this divide is not a clear-cut one and there are cases of golden 
residence programmes (with minimum residence requirements), which lean towards ‘stockholder’ 
citizenship. We will explore this trend in more detail in the empirical part of the paper.  
Investment-based citizenship and residence programmes in the EU 
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3. Mapping investment-based citizenship and residence schemes in the EU 
Given that the states have the ultimate competence in deciding on their membership, citizenship by 
investment can be obtained in different ways across the EU. The investment may result in the outright 
conferral of citizenship, or it may enable the individual to reside in a country and acquire citizenship 
by meeting other naturalisation criteria. In practice, we can distinguish between 1) fully discretionary 
naturalisation on grounds of (economic) national interest; 2) investor citizenship programmes, 
whereby investment leads to full membership with or without further criteria and 3) golden residence 
and entrepreneurial programmes, in which the pecuniary contribution results in different types of 
residence rights while citizenship is conditioned by meeting all other ordinary naturalisation 
conditions. 
In the first two types of these programmes the investment results in citizenship regardless of 
ordinary naturalisation criteria. Although many countries in the world have the discretion to naturalise 
individuals on grounds of cultural, economic, or other achievements, only a few of them have detailed 
investor citizenship programmes. Such programmes, in place in Cyprus and in a few Caribbean island-
states, entail an outright exchange between citizenship and money. Applicants are not bound by 
residence. The granting of citizenship is based on the assumption that the investment is a sufficient 
proof of an individual’s commitment to the new polity. This implies a ‘stockholder citizenship’ 
approach to membership. 
Three EU Member States, Malta, Bulgaria, and Romania operate (‘hybrid’) investor citizenship 
programmes, which unlike the ones listed above have a residence requirement (one year in Malta and 
Bulgaria, four years in Romania). The rationale for classifying the programmes in Malta, Bulgaria and 
Romania as investor citizenship and not as golden residence is twofold. First, these programmes are 
aimed at giving applicants citizenship and not residence. As a consequence, some of the ordinary 
naturalisation criteria, such as language competence, are alleviated. Despite the residence requirement, 
the waiver of other naturalisation conditions points to the ‘stockholder citizenship’ approach.  
By contrast, golden residence programmes exist in a number of EU Member States, including 
Malta, Portugal, Bulgaria, Hungary, Spain, the Netherlands, Greece and the United Kingdom. The 
main rationale behind these programmes is the assumption that the investment will yield economic 
benefits, while also creating strong links between the applicant and the state. In many cases, the 
residence requirement is the same as the one for ordinary migrants, but some countries may act on a 
case-to-case basis and reduce the years of residence required for naturalisation (e.g., Austria, Belgium, 
Portugal). The golden residence programs thus show us the tension between ‘stakeholder’ and 
‘stockholder’ citizenship. They also reveal the different approaches that the countries can have to the 
exchange between money and membership. 
3.1. Discretionary naturalisation of investors  
The practice of facilitated naturalisation of foreign nationals on grounds of their exceptional 
contribution to the country’s society, economy, sports, or culture is common to many a states around 
the globe. This practice, which exists in the majority of the EU Member States, is based on the state’s 
historical prerogative to naturalise individuals on grounds of its national interest, while waiving other 
naturalisation criteria. This type of naturalization is used only in a few cases annually, and sometimes 
the number is limited by law (e.g., not more than ten people annually in Estonia).
2
 The data at the 
European Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO) on Citizenship indicate that out of the 28 Member 
States of the EU, 22 allow discretionary naturalization on grounds of special achievements, which may 
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include, in addition to the economic interest, cultural, sports or scientific one.
3
 The practice of the 28 
Member States of the EU regarding this type of facilitated naturalization is presented in Table 2 
(below).  
Table 2. Facilitated naturalisation on grounds of national interest in the EU Member States
4
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Country 
(Article in 
Nat. Law) 
Provision Economi
c interest  
(explicit) 
Residence 
Austria 
(11(4)) 
 
Person has been resident in Austria for 6 years and 
acquisition of citizenship is in the interest of the country 
in the field of science, commerce, the arts or sport. 
√ √ 
Austria 
(10(6)) 
 
Person has past or future achievements that are in the 
special interest of Austria (constitutional provision). No 
residence or secure income requirement and no 
renunciation of previous citizenship. 
  
Belgium 
(19) 
Person legally resides in Belgium and has demonstrated 
exceptional achievements (scientific, sports, culture) that 
are in the special interest of the country. 
 √ 
Bulgaria 
(16) 
Person has special achievements in the social and 
economic sphere, in science, technology, culture or 
sports.  
√  
Croatia 
(12.1) 
Person is someone whose acquisition of citizenship would 
be in the special interest of Croatia. 
  
Cyprus 
(CYP 111, 
Schedule 3 
Article 2(f)) 
Person has performed special services to Cyprus for 
reasons of public interest. 
√  
Czech 
Republic 
(16) 
Person whose naturalisation is of benefit to the Czech 
Republic in the fields of science, education, culture, 
sports, or if it serves to implement the international 
commitments of the Czech Republic, humanitarian 
purposes, or another state interest.  
 √ 
Estonia (10) Person has special merits in the area of science, culture, 
sports or in other areas (maximum of 10 persons per year). 
  
France (21-
19(6), 21-
18(2), 21-
Person is someone with exceptional services for France or 
a case of special public interest, has rendered or could 
render importance services for France because of her/his 
 √ 
Investment-based citizenship and residence programmes in the EU 
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As the Table 2 (above) shows, the approach of the EU Member States to facilitated naturalisation on 
grounds of national interest is by no means uniform. While the authorities in most countries have the 
right to waive the residence requirement completely, in Belgium, France, Germany and Romania, this 
requirement exists even though, in some cases, the authorities may use the discretionary powers to 
reduce it. In Romania, for ‘honorary citizenship’, which does not grant full membership rights such as 
electoral rights, the residence requirement can be completely abolished. In Austria, if citizenship is 
21) capabilities and talents, or is of French background and 
contributes to the reputation of France and its international 
economic relations with her/his high skills. Residence 
requirement varies (maximum 2 years). 
Germany 
(8) 
Person has been resident in Germany for 3 years and his 
or her acquisition of citizenship is in the special interest of 
the country, e.g. in the field of science, research, trade and 
industry, arts, culture, media, sports or public service. 
 √ 
Greece (13, 
5(3)) 
Person has provided extraordinary services to Greece or 
his/her naturalisation would serve the country's 
extraordinary interests. 
  
Hungary (4 
(7) 
Person serves an important interest of Hungary.   
Ireland (12) Person has done signal honour or rendered distinguished 
service to Ireland, or is the child or grandchild of such a 
person. 
  
Italy (9 (2)) Person has rendered distinguished services to Italy or the 
acquisition of citizenship would serve outstanding public 
interests. 
  
Latvia (13) Person has rendered special meritorious service for the 
benefit of Latvia. 
  
Lithuania 
(20) 
Person makes a substantial contribution to strengthening 
Lithuanian statehood, to increasing the country´s might 
and to promoting its authority in the international 
community. 
  
Luxembour
g (8) 
Person has rendered exceptional services to Luxembourg.    
Malta (10 
(9)) 
Person has rendered exceptional services to Malta or to 
humanity. 
  
Netherlands 
(10) 
Person is a special case    
Portugal 
(6(6)) 
Person has rendered or is called to render relevant services 
to Portugal or to the Portuguese community. 
  
Slovakia (7) Person is someone of special benefit to Slovakia in the 
area of economics, science, technology, culture, sport or 
society, or the person's acquisition is otherwise in the 
interest of the country. 
√ √ 
Slovenia 
(13) 
Person is an adult whose acquisition of citizenship is 
beneficial for the country due to scientific, economic, 
cultural, national or other similar reasons. 
√ √ 
Jelena Džankić 
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conferred on grounds of the constitutional provision 10(6), the residence is completely waived, while 
if the applicant is granted admission under article 11 of the Nationality Act, the mandatory residence 
equals to 6 years.  
Table 2 also indicates that most of the EU Member States have the discretionary right to admit 
individuals on grounds of special interest. In only 4 out 22 countries implementing this type of 
facilitated naturalisation, namely Austria,
5
 Bulgaria, Slovakia and Slovenia, ‘economic’ or 
‘commercial’ interest has been mentioned in the nationality law as grounds for facilitated 
naturalisation. With the exception of Bulgaria, the remaining three countries require residence on their 
soil despite the state’s discretion to naturalise investors. In Austria, the state has the discretion to 
reduce the 10-year residence requirement to 6 years for investors (article 11(4)); Slovakia requires 
investors to be permanent residents (article 7); while Slovenia conditions this type of naturalisation 
with a one year of continuous residence on the country’s soil (article 13).  
In 19 countries of the EU,
6
 provisions on the discretionary naturalisation on grounds of national 
interest do not explicitly mention economic interest. Even so, the state has the discretion to equalise 
the investment with ‘special interest’, or ‘exceptional services’ rendered to the state. The rationale for 
this is that the state seeks to reward those individuals who have de facto made a significant 
contribution to the state. It is assumed that the investment may enhance the country’s economy, and 
create additional job opportunities. Such instances lean more towards the notion of ‘stockholder 
citizenship’, as the investment-based activities are understood to be for the sake of the investor, rather 
than for the benefit of the new polity. Given that European citizenship is a nested one, and dependent 
on the national conception of demos, attributing a pecuniary value to national citizenship, is 
automatically linked to EU citizenship. That is, in such cases, the individuals receive the rights 
attached to EU citizenship without becoming stakeholders either in their new country of nationality, or 
in the EU.  
3.2. Investor citizenship programmes in the EU 
Investor citizenship programmes entail an exchange of money for membership. In the case of ‘pure’ 
investor citizenship programmes, such as the ones existing in the Caribbean islands of St. Kitts and 
Nevis, Commonwealth of Dominica and Antigua and Barbuda (Džankić 2012), other criteria include 
only due diligence and clean criminal record. In the EU, only Cyprus operates a scheme that can be 
classified as a pure investor citizenship programme. In the case of ‘hybrid’ investor citizenship 
programmes, in addition to the pecuniary contribution, due diligence, and a clean criminal record, 
applicants are required to reside in the new country prior to naturalisation. The residence requirement, 
however, is much lower than that in cases of ordinary naturalisation (e.g., one year for investors, ten 
years for other applicants). These hybrid programmes exist in Malta, Bulgaria and Romania from 
among the 28 EU Member States. The ways in which these schemes operate show the iterative 
relationship between investor citizenship and EU citizenship.  
3.2.1. Cyprus 
The investor citizenship programme in Cyprus was introduced on 24 May 2013, two months after the 
announcement of the international bailout of 10 billion euros by the Eurogroup, European Commission 
(EC), European Central Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Due to the levies 
imposed on uninsured benefits, many foreign investors who used the Cypriot favourable tax regime 
incurred multimillion losses. The goal of enhancing the country’s business climate, coupled with the 
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6
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desire to compensate the foreign clients for their losses motivated the Cypriot government to revise the 
investor citizenship programme.
7
 
While previously the Cypriot laws required an investment of 10 million euros in exchange for 
citizenship, the 2013 Scheme for Naturalisation of Investors in Cyprus by Exception on the basis of 
subsection (2) of section 111A of the Civil Registry Laws of 2002-2013 introduced several routes for 
the wealthy to obtain EU citizenship. One of these routes, presented in Table 3 (below) particularly 
aims at compensating the losses of investors incurred due to levies (A6). This route implies a 
‘stockholder citizenship’ approach, because membership is commodified and exchanged not only for 
financial gain that the polity receives through investment, but also for the loss that the investors 
suffered due to the state’s policies. The programme was further revised in March 2014 and investment 
amounts have been changed. 
Table 3. Citizenship by investment in Cyprus (revised, March 2014)
8
 
Article Contribution requirement Other requirements 
A1 – A6 
A1 Investment of 5 million euros in a state-owned company  - Clean criminal 
record 
 
- Not on the list of 
persons whose 
property is frozen in 
the EU 
 
- At least one visit to 
Cyprus 
A2 Direct investment of 5 million euros 
Purchase of property 
Purchase of company based or active in Cyprus 
Purchase of bonds 
Participation in company that carries out public work 
** could be reduced to 2 million euros for collective purchase of 
property amounting to 10 billion euros ** 
A3 Incorporating, acquiring or investing € 5 million in Cypriot 
companies and employing 5 Cypriot nationals 
A4 Bank deposit of 5 million euros 
A5 Combination of A1, A2, and A3 in the amount of 5 million 
euros 
A6 Loss of investment of over 3 million euros due to measures 
introduced in the Bank of Cyprus or Popular Bank after 15 
March 2013 
**Possibility of combining with A1 and A2 to balance out losses of 
less than 3 million** 
As can be seen from Table 3 (above), the principal requirement for naturalisation through investment 
in Cyprus is the pecuniary contribution, which varies from 3 million for losses, to 5 million in direct 
investments, deposits, or acquisitions. Additional criteria include a clean criminal record and at least 
one visit to the country. Interestingly, the 2013 Scheme for Naturalisation of Investors in Cyprus also 
stipulates that periodic checks of whether applicants meet the conditions are possible, and that cases of 
breach may result in the deprivation of citizenship (B3, 2013 Scheme for Naturalisation of Investors in 
Cyprus). The latter provision has been generated by a 2011 controversy involving the wealthy investor 
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Rami Makhlouf, a relative of the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. On 4 January 2011, Makhlouf 
received the citizenship of Cyprus, a few weeks before the start of the protests in Syria. In May 2011, 
the EU imposed sanctions on Makhlouf due to his cooperation with the Syrian repressive regime. The 
EU sanctions led to the revocation of his Cypriot citizenship.  
The above example shows the iterative relationship between EU citizenship and investor 
citizenship programmes. On the one hand, Cyprus uses the benefits of EU citizenship to increase the 
value of its national citizenship and to attract a greater number of investors. On the other hand, the EU, 
and particularly EU citizenship, has proven to offer both opportunities for and constraints to the 
Cypriot investor scheme. First, in the aftermath of the bailout, the Cypriot government revised the 
investor citizenship programme by lowering the investment amounts and by opening a special route 
for individuals who incurred losses due to levies. Second, restrictions and periodic checks were a 
direct product of the Cypriot EU membership. These provisions allow Cyprus to deprive from its 
national - and by extension from EU citizenship - those individuals whose property is frozen at the EU 
level. This indicates an interesting twist in the dynamic between the status of (EU) citizenship and 
property rights; a dynamic that was historically central to the development of the notion of citizenship 
(Morgan Kouser 1979). In the case of investor citizenship in Cyprus, the possession of property is a 
precondition for the status of (national and EU) citizenship, while the freezing or deprivation of 
property by the EU (and not necessarily the individual’s material losses) may result in the loss of 
(national and EU) citizenship.  
3.2.2. Malta 
In October 2013, Malta adopted Act XV of 2013, which amended the Maltese Citizenship Act, Cap 
188, and introduced the much-debated Individual Investor Programme (IIP). This first draft of the IIP 
sparked negative reactions both from within Malta and at the EU level, because it proposed a direct 
exchange of Maltese citizenship for a contribution of 650,000 euros (due diligence and criminal record 
checks apply). The rationale behind Malta’s IIP programme has been the revenue associated with 
investor programmes. According to the country’s Minister of Interior Emmanuel Mallia, “[n]ot only is 
this contribution paid by the applicant non-refundable but this will also help attract quality individuals 
to become Maltese citizens” (Maltese Community 2013, web). Similar remarks, noting that the 
investment is irreversible have also been made by the representatives of Henley and Partners, the 
company which helped to design the IIP, and received the concession for managing it (Camilleri 2013, 
web).  
However, as the outright exchange of membership for money resulted in much domestic and 
international contention (van Gorp 2014, web), Malta revised its IIP in November 2013. The Act LN 
of 2013, that amended the Maltese Citizenship Act, Cap 188, and the IIP, stipulated additional criteria 
that the investors were required to meet in order to become eligible for the status of Malta and EU 
citizenship. These additional criteria included either the possession of property in the value of 350,000 
euros, or the rental of property for at least 16,000 euros per year (article 4); and an additional 
investment of 150,000 euros into a project determined by the state authorities (article 5). That is, apart 
from increasing the amount of the contribution and specifying its targets, the amendments did not 
require further commitment on behalf of the investors.  
The amended policy of Malta caused discontent among other EU Member States, which expressed 
concerns that such a programme could potentially negatively affect EU-wide security and result in an 
influx of wealthy individuals with criminal backgrounds (van Gorp 2014,web). As a consequence, the 
implementation of the IIP was put on hold for several months. Moreover, it spawned concerns over the 
effects of such schemes on the value of EU citizenship, which was a topic of the EP debate held in 
mid-January 2014. The conclusions to the EP debate reaffirmed that even though the regulation of 
citizenship was an exclusive competence of the Member States, highlighted that there was a concern 
‘that this way of obtaining citizenship in Malta, as well as any other national scheme that may involve 
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the direct or indirect outright sale of citizenship, undermines the very concept of European citizenship’ 
(M. 1. In EP resolution 2013/2995(RSP). Hence the conclusions represented a call upon Malta to 
revise its investor citizenship programme and bring it ‘into line with the EU’s values’ (M. 12. In EP 
resolution 2013/2995(RSP).  
While the Maltese authorities received a strong signal from Brussels that IIP needs to be changed, 
no amendments were made immediately following the debate (Carrera 2014). Rather, the Directorate 
General Justice considered initiating infringement proceedings for the incompatibility of the scheme 
with EU law. Eventually, after a meeting between the representatives of Malta and DG Justice took 
place in late January, the two parties reached an agreement on amending the scheme to include a 
residence requirement as evidence of genuine ties with the country (EC Press Release MEMO/14/70, 
29/1/2014). Subsequently, in February 2014, Malta amended its IIP adding a one-year effective 
residence requirement. The current conditions for obtaining the citizenship of Malta through 
investment are presented in Table 4 (below).  
Table 4. Citizenship by investment in Malta
9
 
Provision Contribution requirement Other requirements 
2 (d), 
Schedule 
of fees 1 
(a) 
Contribution of 650,000 euros (main applicant)  
One year residence 
in Malta (180 days) 
 
Clean criminal 
record, no major 
offences  
 
Due diligence – 
proof of moral 
standing 
 
Health certificate 
and insurance 
 
Oath of allegiance 
25,000 euros (spouse) 
25,000 euros (each minor child) 
50,000 euros (each unmarried dependant between 18 and 26 
years of age) 
50,000 euros (each dependant over 55 years of age) 
2 (e), 5 (a 
– I), or 5 
(a-II) 
Property purchase valued at 350,000 euros 
Lease of property at 16,000 euros per annum 
2 (f), 6 Investment of 150,000 euros in bonds, debentures, or other 
projects determined by the state 
Schedule 
of fees 
Due diligence fees 
2 (1) a 7,500 euros (main applicant) 
2 (1) b 5,000 euros (spouse) 
2 (1) c 3,000 euros (each child aged 13 to 18) 
2 (1) d 5,000 euros (each unmarried dependant between 18 and 26 years 
of age) 
2 (1) e 5,000 euros (each unmarried dependant between 18 and 26 years 
of age) 
2 (2) a Passport fee 500 eur 
2 (2) b Bank fee 200 eur 
Similar to Cyprus, the case of Malta also shows the iterative relationship between investor citizenship 
and EU citizenship. As regards the effects of EU citizenship on Malta’s IIP, it is manifested at two 
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levels. First, the association with EU citizenship increases the value of the citizenship of Malta as it is 
attached to rights that are enforceable beyond this country’s borders. Second, in practical terms, the 
same association generated concerns among other EU Member States regarding the admission of 
investors in the nested polity, as other Member States are liable for enforcing the EU citizenship rights 
stemming from the investor’s status as a Maltese national. While the former effect opened up 
opportunities for Malta to develop IIP, the latter resulted in top-down pressures that eventually 
generated the restriction to the programme through the introduction of the residence requirement. At 
the same time, Malta’s IIP resonated at the level of EU citizenship. It showed how investment-based 
naturalisation distorts citizenship regimes, because some of the Member States approach their national 
membership as a commodity, and EU citizenship as an opportunity structure, which increases the 
worth of their citizenship on the market.  
3.2.3. Bulgaria and Romania 
The two countries that joined the EU in 2007, Bulgaria and Romania, operate ‘hybrid’ investor 
citizenship schemes. That is, the granting of citizenship in these countries is conditional upon 
maintaining residence rights given to the investor prior to his or her application for naturalisation. 
Such schemes differ from the one in Malta, where the application for residence is an integral part of 
the investor citizenship programme.  
In September 2013, Bulgaria adopted changes to its Law on Foreigners, with the aim of attracting 
more investment in the country, and subsequently expanded opportunities for citizenship by 
investment. Article 25 (para 1, pt. 6) of the Law on Foreigners stipulates that a permanent residence 
permit can be obtained following an investment of 1 million Bulgarian leva (0.52 million euros) in 
either of the following: Bulgarian trade companies with tradable shares, state bonds, ownership of over 
50% of a Bulgarian company, intellectual property and trademark, rights to concession in Bulgaria. 
According to the same article (article 25, para 1, pt. 8), an investment of 6 million Bulgarian leva (3.12 
million euros) in Bulgarian trade companies with shares that are not tradable on the market, also gives 
the applicant the right to permanent residence. Alternatively, the applicant may use the provisions of 
the Investment Promotion Act in conjunction with article 25c of the Foreigners Act and invest in a 
class A project (amounts vary from 5.6 to 16.3 million euros) in order to obtain permanent residence.  
These provisions of the Law on Foreigners are directly linked to article 14a of the Bulgarian 
Citizenship Act (Table 5 below), which stipulates that, individuals who have held a residence permit 
on grounds of article 25 (para 1, pts. 6 and 8) of the Law on Foreigners for at least one year become 
eligible for this country’s citizenship. Equally, those individuals who have obtained permanent 
residence on grounds of article 25c and hold an approved class A project also become candidates for 
the Bulgaria citizenship by investment programme. Additional requirements include only that the 
applicant is of age (article 12, para 1, pt. 1) and that he or she has not been convicted of a premeditated 
crime by a Bulgarian court (or that the sentence has expired) (article 12, para 1, pt. 3). 
  
Investment-based citizenship and residence programmes in the EU 
13 
Table 5. Citizenship by investment in Bulgaria
10
 
Permanent residence (Law on Foreigners)  
 
Citizenship by investment 
(Citizenship Act) 
Prov. Contribution Prov. Condition 
Article 
25 (para 
1, pt. 6) 
1 million Bulgarian leva (€0.52 million) 14a One year permanent 
residence  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 
25c 
Class A investment project (Investment 
Promotion act) 
12, 
para 
1, pt 
1. 
18 years of age 
€16.3 
million 
Regular projects 
 
€8.18 
million 
Projects in areas with high 
unemployment 
12, 
para 
1, pt 
3. 
Non-conviction in Bulgaria 
High technology in industry 
sector 
€5.62 
million 
High technology in service 
sector 
As can be seen from Table 6 (below), Romania also operates a ‘hybrid’ citizenship by investment 
scheme, which in addition to the 1 million euros investment requires compulsory residence, and the 
fulfilment of other criteria. However, the nature of the Romanian programme is somewhat different 
from the Bulgarian one. Rather than resulting in the outright conferral of citizenship following a one-
year permanent residency, the investment gives the discretionary right to the Romanian authorities to 
reduce the ordinary residence requirement from 8 to 4 years (article 8, para 2d).  
Table 6. Citizenship by investment in Romania
11
 
Provision Contribution Other criteria 
Art. 8, para 
2d 
1,000,000 euros Loyalty to the Romanian state 
18 years of age  
Means for a decent living 
Non-conviction in Romania or abroad for 
any action that would make him unworthy 
of being a Romanian citizen 
Language and culture 
Constitution and anthem 
 
 
Residence reduced from 8 to 4 years 
 
 
Unlike Bulgaria, which waives other ordinary naturalisation conditions, Romania retains all others 
including age, loyalty to the Romanian state, clean criminal record, language and culture, and the 
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knowledge of the Constitution and the anthem (article 8, para 1). This makes this ‘hybrid’ scheme lean 
more towards ‘stakeholder citizenship’ than the Bulgarian one.  
3.4. Investment-based residence programmes in the EU 
Investment-based residence programmes require the applicant to reside in the country prior to 
naturalisation. In other words, the pecuniary contribution offers entry and stay in the country of 
destination to the applicant, with the prospect of obtaining citizenship in the future. The relationship 
between these programmes and European citizenship is somewhat different than that of pure and 
hybrid investor citizenship programmes. On the one hand, they do not offer the applicant the benefits 
of European citizenship, as they restrict residence and employment rights to a single Member State. 
On the other hand, they facilitate at least one of the criteria for naturalisation of wealthy individuals.  
Empirical evidence points to two types of residence programmes based on pecuniary contribution: 
1) golden residence programmes regulated clearly through residence laws, with amounts of the 
contribution and other criteria that such contribution should meet; 2) entrepreneurial schemes, which 
are less defined through laws and whereby residence is granted through authorities’ discretion on 
grounds of entrepreneurial activity. Some of the EU Member States operate both types of these 
programmes. Equally, the type of residence (long term, permanent) that these schemes give access to 
is different across the EU.  
3.4.1. Golden residence programmes 
Golden residence programmes are based on the pecuniary contribution as the key entry and stay 
criterion for the applicant. In order to ensure the effectiveness of the investment, these countries have 
established specific regulation of how the investment should be handled in order to enable the 
applicant to require renewal of the residence permit after one to two years, as well as the meeting of 
other naturalisation conditions to eventually receive citizenship.  
Therefore, naturalisation is conditioned upon maintaining the resident status for several years in the 
given EU Member State. However, the definition of residency is by no means uniform in the 
underlying countries. In some countries, the applicant is required to spend only a few weeks each year 
in order to be able to retain the third-country resident status (e.g. Portugal). In others, the golden 
residence programmes require the investor to spend a substantial amount of time therein, or to relocate 
to the said country making it the focal point of his or her business activity (e.g. France). This has the 
potential to turn ‘stockholder into ‘stakeholder’ citizens.  
Table 7 (below), represents a schematic overview of the criteria for investment, duration of 
residence granted in the first instance, the possibility to extend the residence granted, and the residence 
requirement needed to obtain the citizenship of these countries. It covers only those countries, which 
have clear programs, with amounts of investment included in their laws.
12
 Criteria differ not only in 
terms of the amount of investment required, but also in terms of the type of investment and its effect 
on economy. There are also variations in the type and duration of residence across countries.  
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Table 7. Golden residence in the EU28
13
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Country Law 
/Programme 
Contribution in euros Duration and type 
of residence 
Citizenship
14
 
Bulgaria 
Aliens Act, art. 
24 (19) 
 
 
€ 0.306 million in real 
estate 
 
 
 
1 year, temporary, 
renewable 
 
 
 
 
5 years 
OR 
€ 0.306 million in 
company shares 
Aliens Act, art. 
24 (20) 
 
€ 0.127 million 
investment in a 
company in poorer 
regions (over 50% of 
company’s shares) 
AND 
Jobs for 5 Bulgarian 
citizens 
France 
Law no. 2011-
672 
€ 10 million  
10 years, 
temporary, 
renewable 
 
 
5 years 
AND 
50 jobs in France 
Greece 
Greece Alien 
Act, art 26. 
€ 0.3 million  2 years, temporary, 
renewable 
7 years 
Hungary 
Act No 2 on the 
Admission and 
Right of 
Residence of 
Third Country 
Nationals 
€ 250,000  5 years, temporary, 
possibility to apply 
for a long-term 
national permit 
after 6 months 
8 years 
Ireland 
Immigrant 
Investor 
€ 2 million in 
immigrant investor 
2 years, renewable 5 out of last 9 
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Programme bonds (5 years) years 
OR 
€ 1 million in a single 
Irish enterprise (3 
years) 
OR 
Mixed investment of € 
1 million: property 
(max 50%) and 
investment  
OR 
Donation of € 0.5 
million in a project of 
public benefit 
Malta 
Global Residence 
Programme 
Own a property of € 
0.275 million in Malta 
(€ 0.22million in the 
south of Malta; €0.25 
million in Gozo 
1 year, temporary, 
annual renewal 
5 out of the last 
7 years 
OR 
Rent a property at 
minimum  €9,600 per 
annum (€ 8,750 in the 
south of Malta and 
Gozo) 
Netherlands 
Decree of 
September 23, 
2013 establishing 
the entry into 
force of the 
Modern 
Migration Act, as 
regards the 
admission of 
wealthy  
foreigners 
 
€1,25 million in a 
company located in the 
Netherlands. 
1 year, temporary, 
renewable 
5 years 
Portugal 
Regulation no 
11820-A/2012 
€1 million (investment 
must be maintained for 
5 years) 
1 year, temporary, 
renewed for 2-year 
periods after year 1  
6 years 
OR 
Investment-based citizenship and residence programmes in the EU 
17 
                                                     
15
 Renewal conditions: within 3 months of entry in the UK (or 12 months preceding the entry), the individual must invest 
€0.91 million of the money possessed in government bonds, share capital or loan capital in UK companies, while the 
remaining €0.3 million must be used to purchase assets or held in a UK financial institution. 
Creation of 30 jobs 
OR 
Purchase of property 
for at least € 0.5 
million  
Romania 
Emergency 
Ordinance No. 
194 from 12 
December 2002, 
art. 43 
€100,000 (stock 
company)/ €70,000 
limited company) 
1 year, temporary, 
renewed annually 
for minimum 
investments. 
 
3 year extension 
for investments of 
€500.000 or 
creation of over 50 
jobs  
8 years 
OR 
Create 10 jobs (limited 
company)/15 jobs 
(stock company) 
Spain 
Law 14/2013, on 
the assistance to 
investors and 
their 
internationalisati
on  
€2 million in debt 
bonds 
2 years, temporary, 
renewable 
10 years 
OR 
€1 million in Spanish 
companies 
OR 
Purchase of property 
for at least €0.5 million  
OR 
Entrepreneurial project 
resulting in jobs and 
development 
United 
Kingdom 
Immigration 
Rules for the Tier 
1 (Investor) 
category 
Possess €1.21 million 
disposable in the UK 
1 year, temporary, 
1 year, renewable.
15
 
 
5 years + 1 
year ILR 
OR 
own assets valued 
at min. € 2.24 million  
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In terms of the amounts of investment required under the golden residence programmes, there is a 
dynamic different from that under investor citizenship schemes, due to the linkage of the programme 
to a single country. Consequently, the contribution under golden residence programmes varies from 
70,000 euros in Romania to 10 million euros in France. The reason for such a discrepancy in the 
amount of investment required under golden residence programmes is the economy, which in some 
countries is more favourable and thus more attractive to investors than in others. In the former (e.g., 
UK, France) the pecuniary contribution required for residence is higher than in the latter (e.g., 
Romania, Bulgaria). In other words, golden residence programmes already follow a market logic, 
whereby the price is set through the laws of supply and demand.  
Yet, these programmes are not static, and since the start of the crisis in the Eurozone in 2009, 
several countries reformed or re-introduced golden residence programmes. Spain, Portugal, and 
Hungary are among those countries. The preamble to the Spanish legislation for this programme 
stipulates that, ‘Spain is experiencing a grave and large economic crisis, with acute social 
consequences. Between 2008 and 2012, almost 1.9 million companies in Spain have been destroyed 
[…]’ (Preamble, Lei 14/2013). This clearly correlates the country’s decision to revert to golden 
residence as a mechanism of dealing with the effects of the crisis. Similarly, Ireland, which operated 
an investor citizenship programme from 1989 to 1994, reverted to golden residence in 2012.
16
 Unlike 
the previous scheme, the new Irish golden residence programme, instead of involving an outright 
exchange between a pecuniary contribution and citizenship, in addition to an investment of over 1 
million euros, entails compulsory residence and other criteria prior to naturalisation.  
Malta, which in late 2013 launched its investor citizenship scheme, also runs a golden residence 
programme. Malta’s ‘Global Residence Programme’ was launched in mid-2013, substituting the 
previous ‘High Net Worth Individuals Scheme’. The comparison of these two residence-based 
programmes, reveals that the investment under the ‘High Net Worth Individuals Scheme’ was 
significantly higher: the minimum value of the purchased real estate was set at 400,000 euros (now 
220,000-270,000); the minimum rental value was 20,000 euros (now 8,750-9,600); the lowest tax was 
set at 25,000 euros (now 15,000); and a 0.5 million euros bond was required. The lowering of the 
investment thresholds in Malta is an indicator of the ‘race to the bottom’, which does not happen as a 
result of the competition among countries. Rather, it depends on the competitiveness of the country 
itself and the changes in its economic outlook. 
This dynamic can also be seen in the case of UK, which operates a golden residence programme for 
investors, in principle similar to those of other countries. However, the UK offers a more stable 
business climate than countries such as Malta, Spain, Bulgaria, etc. Ahead of the amendments to the 
UK immigration policy in April 2014,
17
 a debate took place on the possibility of auctioning residence, 
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 There are also proposals for increasing the investment thresholds to 2 – 2.5 million GBP.  
AND 
Possess €1.21 million 
loaned by a UK bank 
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i.e., granting golden residence to the highest bidders (Migration Advisory Committee 2014: 8). The 
proposal was to create two routes for investors to enter the UK: 1) investors using the regular Tier 1 
route, who would invest a fixed amount and receive a one-year residence permit; and 2) investors 
entering the UK as highest bidders, who would receive a settlement permit after 2 years (instead of 5) 
and for whom residence requirements would be relaxed (Migration Advisory Committee 2014: 8). The 
second option, i.e. the auctioning of permits with special additional benefits, would bring this route of 
Tier 1 closer to investor citizenship programmes operating in Malta, Bulgaria, and Romania. The 
interesting development in this respect is the ‘pay-what-you-bid-for’ approach, where the individual 
investors, and not the state, determine the pecuniary value of residence. The proposals for the 
regulation of bidding for residence in the UK also include ‘sharing’ the bids, which would reduce the 
individual’s potential for success. Even though the proposal to auction residence rights was 
abandoned, such an approach, including explicit references to residence as a ‘product’ in the Migration 
Advisory Committee report (2014: 89), indicate a shift towards commodification of residence and 
citizenship in the UK. 
3.4.2. Entrepreneurial residence programmes 
Instead of the golden residence programmes, some EU Member States operate entrepreneurial 
residence schemes. These programmes aim either to attract migrants of independent economic means, 
or entrepreneurs who intend to set up a business in an EU Member State. Investors commonly obtain a 
one-year renewable residence permit and naturalisation is conditioned upon meeting the ordinary 
residence conditions. Such programmes exist in a number of EU Member States, including Austria, 
Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Lithuania, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, and Sweden. The regulation of these programmes is very diverse, and requires a comparison 
that exceeds the scope of this analysis.  
Even though these programs offer access to the EU Member States on grounds of money, they also 
require the investor to engage, through entrepreneurial activity, with his or her destination country and 
to establish social, economic, and personal links with other members of the polity. Therefore, these 
programmes also have the potential to turn ‘stockholder’ citizens into genuine ‘stakeholders’ in both 
the national and, upon naturalisation, in the nested polity.  
Conclusions and implications 
In examining the membership of polities, it is important to consider the emergence of new 
transnational, supranational and subnational political spaces (Bauböck 2003). The EU, as a sui generis 
complex, nested, polity offers ample opportunities to discern how the relationship between individuals 
and the state reflects upon their rights and duties in the EU as the encompassing polity. Citizenship by 
investment is a lens that provides a fresh look on the intricacies of citizenship beyond the borders of 
the state.  
Based on an empirical research of citizenship and residence laws in all the 28 Member States of the 
EU, the paper mapped the investment-based membership in three categories: 1) discretionary 
naturalisation on grounds of (economic) national interest; 2) investor citizenship programmes; and 3) 
golden residence and entrepreneurial programmes. Moreover, by considering the different approaches 
of countries to this type of facilitated naturalisation, the paper examined the iterative relationship 
between investor citizenship and EU citizenship. In other words, it looked into how the EU citizenship 
impacts on the opportunities and constraints for investor citizenship, and how investor citizenship 
affects the membership in a nested polity.  
The analysis started with a section discerning the nuances of the relationship between national and 
EU citizenship. By looking at the activation of rights attached to EU citizenship, the section 
maintained that EU citizenship increases the value of national citizenship. This opens up avenues for 
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countries to adopt investor citizenship programmes, as national membership offers additional benefits 
at the level of the nested polity. The section then proceeded to analyse the implications that these 
programmes have on the value of EU citizenship, by counterpoising ‘stockholder’ and ‘stakeholder’ 
citizenship. ‘Stockholder’ citizens have only an instrumental interest in becoming members of a polity, 
and this interest can be materialised through a pecuniary contribution. By contrast, ‘stakeholder’ 
citizens have a genuine interest in the future wellbeing and prosperity of the community. The different 
countries in the EU apply both ‘stockholder’ and ‘stakeholder’ approaches to citizenship, which is 
legitimated by the fact that the regulation of citizenship is a prerogative of the Member State. 
However, the fact that all the EU states are members of a nested polity reveals a tension between 
preferential admittance of ‘stockholders’ when compared to ‘stakeholders’. This reveals the tension 
between national and EU citizenship. That is, regardless of whether membership was conceived 
through ‘stockholding’ or ‘stakeholding’ it gives rise to equal EU citizenship rights. These issues are 
manifested differently in the three types of schemes examined in the empirical part of the paper.  
The perils of both the discretionary naturalization and the investor programmes are twofold. First, 
they have the potential to distort the relationship between national and of EU citizenship. Having in 
mind the market logic of competitiveness, treating citizenship as a product that can be exchanged for 
money, has already started to show a ‘race to the bottom’. With an increasing number of countries 
implementing investor citizenship programmes that give rise to EU-wide rights, countries seek to 
attract investors to obtain their citizenship, which will lead to lowering the bar for membership. This 
can be observed in the cases of Malta and Cyprus, in particular. Second, these programmes reflect not 
only a tension within EU citizenship itself, but also a problem regarding the Member States’ approach 
to national membership. That is, the rights attached to EU citizenship, based on values of mutual trust 
and sincere cooperation, create an opportunity structure for the Member States to offer rights beyond 
their borders. In other words, while the Member State governments appear to commodify their own 
passport (the status of citizenship) on grounds of access to EU-wide rights, they also open up the 
question of rights of citizenship that the respective status entitles the individual to enjoy (nationally 
and EU-wide). Moreover, while the Member States retain the ‘stakeholder citizenship’ for ordinary 
migrants and increasingly require evidence of integration, such conditions are abolished or alleviated 
for investors. This implies a ‘stockholder citizenship’ approach to national, and by extension, to EU 
citizenship.  
The described tensions are somewhat less pronounced in the ‘golden residence’ and entrepreneurial 
programmes, based on an exchange between a pecuniary contribution and residence rights in given EU 
Member State. First, the investor is commonly subject to all other naturalisation criteria, including 
residence, language, integration, etc. By meeting these conditions, the investor is bound to establish 
durable personal, social, and economic ties to his or her new polity. Hence, the ‘stockholding’ can 
eventually become subsumed by ‘stakeholding’, if conditions for maintaining residence rights is the 
same for investors and ordinary migrants. Second, ‘golden residence’ and entrepreneurial programmes 
become linked to EU citizenship only once the individual becomes a citizen. In other words, they offer 
access to the country, with limited rights arising from residence, but neither to full citizenship rights 
nor to those arising from the country’s EU membership.  
Despite being less contentious on these two matters, the ‘golden residence’ and entrepreneurial 
programmes still distort the values underpinning democratic citizenship. The empirical analysis of 
programmes applied in 11 EU Member States points to a dynamic different to that of the investor 
citizenship programmes. In terms of investment, these programmes already follow a market logic, 
whereby the price of access is determined through supply and demand. In other words, the varying 
amounts of contribution can be explained through the country’s economic and business climate and its 
attractiveness for foreign investors. Thus it is not surprising that the wealthier EU Member States 
require a higher investment than the new or the poorer Member States.  
This said, it is worth mentioning here, that despite the fact that citizenship is a national domain, the 
schemes described in this paper raise further normative questions, such as whether it is proportionate 
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and just that access to the array of rights of EU citizenship is exchanged for money. Hence it is 
expected that further research on this topic will examine whether the effects of investor citizenship 
decrease the value of citizenship to a tradable commodity, voiding it of the sense of rights and duties 
and undermining citizens’ solidarity, or if the economic benefits to states override these normative 
concerns.  
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